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 Using the “Keynes+Schumpeter” (K+S) agent-based model developed we
study how the interplay between firms’ investment behavior and income distri-
bution shapes the short—and long-run dynamics of the economy at the
aggregate level. We study the dynamics of investment under two different
scenarios. One in which investment is fully determined by past profits, and one
in which investment is tied to expectations about future consumption demand.
We show that, independently from the investment scenario analyzed, the emer-
gence of steady growth with low unemployment requires a balance in the
income distribution between profits and wages. If this is not the case, the
economy gets locked either in stagnation equilibria, or into growth trajectories
displaying high volatility and unemployment rates. Moreover, in the demand-
led scenario we show the emergence of a non-linear relation between real wages
and unemployment. Finally, we study whether increasing degrees of wage-flexi-
bility are able to restore growth and unemployment and reduce the volatility in
the economy. We show that this is indeed the case only when investment is
profit-led. In contrast, in the scenario where investment is driven by demand
expectations wage-flexibility has no effect on either growth and unemploy-
ment. In turn, this result casts doubts on the ability of wage-flexibility policies
to stabilize the economy.
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 This work studies how the interplay between firms’ invest-
ment behavior, wage formation and income distribution affect the
short-run and long-run aggregate dynamics of an economy. We
study the aggregate behavior of the economy under two different
scenarios: one wherein investment in new productive capacities is
determined by past profits of firms (“profit-led scenario”) and one
in which firm investment depends on expectations about future
consumption demand (“demand-led” scenario). We show that in
both scenarios the distribution of income between profits and
wages crucially affects the characteristics of the growth path of the
economy. Independently from the investment rule adopted by
firms, the emergence of long-run growth associated with low rates
of unemployment and short-run volatility always requires a
balance in the distribution between profits and wages. Lacking
such a requirement, the economy can get stuck either into stagna-
tion equilibria with low growth and high unemployment, or into
trajectories characterized by high and volatile growth. Further-
more, we study the relation between the level of real wages and
unemployment in the economy. We show that the economy
displays the Neo-Classical (positive) relation between the two
variables only in the profit-led scenario. In contrast, in the
demand-led scenario such a relation is non-linear. In particular, it
exists a threshold below which unemployment increases (rather
than decreasing) with a reduction in real wages. Finally, we explore
whether increasing degrees of nominal wage sensitivity to unem-
ployment variations are effective in curbing unemployment and
stabilizing the economy. Our results show that this is the case only
in the profit-led scenario, provided that the characteristics of the
income distribution allow the economy to grow in the long-run. In
contrast, in the demand-led scenario, wage-flexibility is never able
to reduce unemployment, and can sometimes increase the inci-
dence of economic crises.
Our work is motivated by two different streams of literature.
First, we refer to a central debate in macroeconomics, i.e. the one
about the role of wages in determining unemployment in the
economy. On one side, the “Neo-Classical View” identifies into
real wage rigidity the main source of unemployment in labor
markets. Following an adverse shock to the economy, production
Wage formation, investment behavior and growth regimes: An agent-based analysis 237
and labor demand will fall, and real wages must also decrease in
order to equilibrate demand and supply of labor. A rigid real wage
impedes such an adjustment and thus leads to unemployment in
the labor market. In contrast, downward flexibility of nominal
wages allows the reduction of the real wage down to the new level
compatible with full employment and thus the reduction of unem-
ployment.2 On the opposite camp, we find all works that starting
from Keynes (1936) pointed to deficiencies in effective demand as
the main source of unemployment. Moreover, in line with the
intuition of Keynes, these works (see Howitt, 1986; Amendola et
al., 2004) warned against the destabilizing effect of the downward
nominal wage flexibility . This is because a reduction of nominal
wages is likely to adversely affect consumption demand and to
induce deflationary pressures in the economy, with the conse-
quence of increasing (rather than decreasing) the level of
unemployment in the economy.3
Second, our work is related to both evolutionary (Freeman and
Perez, 1988; Coriat and Dosi, 2000; Chiaromonte et al., 2000) and
French “Régulation” research programs (see Aglietta, 1979, Boyer,
1988, see Lordon, 1991, for a survey), that study how “growth
regimes”, as well as crises, are generated by the matching or
mismatching between, on the one hand, processes of technical
change and, on the other hand, the characteristics of the processes
governing firms’ behavior and the division of income in the
economy.
We contribute to the above strands of literature along several
dimensions. First, we show how different growth regimes emerge
out of micro-interactions between heterogeneous agents. In that
fashion, our work provides a micro-foundation of early evolutionary
and “regulationist” theories of the role of institutions, demand-
formation patterns, and technical change in determining both
2. This approach is also largely followed by New Keynesian DSGE models (e.g. Smets and
Wouters, 2007). These models claim that price and wage rigidities constitute the main
impediments to full employment. Without such rigidities and in line with the Neo-Classical
View the economy would be able to adjust to whatever shock and keep the labour market at the
full employment equilibrium.
3. Another strand of research in the New Keynesian literature (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993)
warns against the perils of downward flexibility of nominal wages. Still, in these models
unexpected increases in real wages increase firms costs, thus leading to a reduction of firms’ net
worth and to lower levels of investment and output.
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growth and business cycles. Second, we highlight the role of
income distribution as a crucial factor determining the characteris-
tics of growth paths followed by the economy. Third, by studying
the relation between wages and unemployment into different
investment scenarios, we study under which conditions one
observes the validity of either the Neo-Classical or Keynesian view
about the effectiveness of policies increasing the degree of wage
flexibility in the economy. Finally, we extend the analysis of wage-
flexibility to encompass also its long-term effects on the economy.
We perform the above investigations by extending the
“Keynes+Schumpeter” (K+S) model developed in Dosi et al. (2010)
and Dosi et al. (2012), that bridges Keynesian theories of demand-
generation and Schumpeterian theories of technology-fueled
economic growth. In Dosi et al. (2010), we studied the conse-
quences of different “innovation regimes”—and related policies—
and their interaction with (Keynesian) demand management. In
Dosi et al. (2012) we focused instead on the interactions between
income distribution on one hand, and monetary and fiscal policies
on the other hand. In this paper we exclude fiscal and monetary
policies from the picture, and we rather study how the interactions
between income distribution and firm investment behavior affect
the short—and long-run dynamics at the aggregate level. In addi-
tion, we try to assess whether different levels of nominal wage
sensitivity to variations in unemployment may promote long-run
growth and reduce output volatility and unemployment.
The work is structured as follows. Section 1 briefly presents the
K+S model. Section 2 presents the simulation results, starting with
the analysis of growth regimes under different income distribu-
tions and investment behavior (Section 2.1), and then moving to
the analysis of the effects of wage-flexibility to unemployment
variations (Section 2.2). Section 3 concludes.
1. The K+S model 
Let us now briefly discuss the K+S model developed in Dosi et al.
(2010) and extended in Dosi et al. (2012), to which we refer for
more details. The model portrays an economy composed of a
machine-producing sector made of F1 firms (denoted by the subs-
cript i), a consumption-good sector made of F2 firms (denoted by
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the subscript j), LS consumers/workers, and a public sector. Capital-
good firms invest in R&D and produce heterogeneous machines.
Consumption-good firms combine machine tools bought by
capital-good firms and labor in order to produce a final product for
consumers. Capital-good firms are paid in advance for the
machines they have to produce. Consumption-good firms finance
their production and investment expenditures by using internal
funds and external financing provided by an un-modeled banking
sector. The latter provides credit to firms up to a credit ceiling that
depends of firms’ past sales.4 Finally, the public sector levies taxes
on firms’ profits and pays unemployment benefits. In what
follows, we present the timeline of events in the K+S model. Next
we will briefly describe each part of it.
1.1. The timeline of events
In any given time period (t), the following microeconomic deci-
sions take place in sequential order:
1.  Policy variables are fixed (e.g. the “Government” setting tax
rates and unemployment benefits, etc.). 
2.  Machine-tool firms perform R&D trying to discover new
products and more efficient production techniques and to
imitate the production technology and the products of their
competitors. Capital-good firms advertise their machines to
consumption-good firms. 
3.  Consumption-good firms decide how much to produce and
invest. If investment is positive, consumption-good firms
choose their supplier, send their orders and pay for the
machines. When internal funds are not enough to finance
production and investment plans, firms borrow up to a ceiling. 
4.  In both industries firms hire workers according to their produc-
tion plans if below their credit ceiling or at the ceiling otherwise
and start producing. 
5.  Imperfectly competitive consumption-good market opens. The
market shares of firms evolve according to their price
competitiveness. 
4. In Dosi et al. (2012) we model a banking sector that gathers deposits from firms and
provides credit to them on a pecking order that depends on the firms’ past net-worth-to-sales
ratio.
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6.  Firms in both sectors compute their net cash flow, pay back
their due loans to the bank to the extent that they have cash
flow to do that. 
7.  Entry and exit take place. In both sectors firms with near-zero
market shares and/or a negative stock of net liquid assets are
eschewed from their industry and replaced by new firms (for
simplicity, we keep the number of firms fixed; any dead firm is
replaced by a new one; and entrant firms are random copies of
incumbent ones). 
8.  Machines ordered at the beginning of the period are delivered
and become part of the capital stock at time t + 1. 
At the end of each time step, aggregate variables (e.g. GDP,
investment, employment) are computed, summing over the
corresponding microeconomic quantities.
1.2. The capital-good industry
The technology of capital-good firms evolves along the vintages
of produced machine-tools. Each firm-specific generation of
machine-tools has indeed a distinct production cost and distinct
labour productivity for the user. The price of machines is set with a
mark-up rule5 over production costs. The quality of each vintage is
measured by the productivity of machines in the consumption-
good sector.
Innovation and imitation are costly processes: firms invest in
R&D a fraction of their revenues and hire researchers at the current
market wage.
Both innovation and imitation follow a two-steps stochastic
process. In the first step, the resources allocated to search deter-
mine in probability whether the events “innovation” and
“imitation” are drawn. Note that the newly discovered capital
goods might be a “failed innovation”, because production costs
might be higher and/or user-efficiency might be lower than the
currently manufactured machines. Indeed, at the second stochastic
stage, each firm draws the characteristics of the would-be machine
and decide whether to keep on producing the current generation
of machines or to switch to the new vintage, by evaluating the
5. This in line with survey data evidence on firm pricing behavior (see Fabiani et al., 2006).
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possible trade-off between production costs and productive effi-
ciencies. Once the machine tool is chosen, capital-good firms try to
reach their customers under conditions of imperfect information:
hence, we assume that they send a “brochure” with the price and
the productivity of their machines to both their historical clients
and a random sample of potential new customers.
1.3. The consumption-good industry
Consumption-good firms produce an homogenous good using
capital (i.e. their stock of machines) and labor under constant
returns to scale. We assume alternative scenarios for firms’ produc-
tion and investment decisions.6 In the first scenario, we assume as
in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) and Delli Gatti et al. (2005) that
desired production (Qdj ) is determined by the level of firm stock of
liquid assets (NWj), according to7: 
(1)
In turn, the level of firms’ net worth is determined—via cash
flows—by the past level of profits. Following Boyer (1988) we label
the above profit-led investment scenario. Notice that we here we
attempt to describe the economic dynamics in a highly hypothe-
tical scenario wherein both desired production and desired
investment are not limited by demand.8
In contrast, in the second scenario, that we label demand-led
investment scenario, firms plan their production according to adap-
tive demand expectations (Dej ): 
(2)
where Dj (t – 1) is the demand actually faced by firm j at time t – 1
(h positive integer)9. The desired level of production depends on
6. To simplify notation and unless it needed for the sake of clarity, in what follows we
suppress the time index to indicate variables in the text.
7. This kind of firm behavior may emerge in models where firms are equity rationed and face
positive bankruptcy costs. See Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) for more details.
8. As it is discussed at more length in Boyer (1988), this kind of scenario however captures
some key features of the dynamics of investment in capitalistic economies of the 19th century.
9. For maximum simplicity, here we use the rule Dej (t) = Dj (t – 1). In Dosi et al. (2006) we check
the robustness of the simulation results employing more sophisticated expectation-formation
rules. We found that increasing the computational capabilities of firms does not significantly
change either the average growth rates or the stability of the economy. These properties still
hold in the model presented here.
 ( ) = ( 1), > 0dj jQ t NW tσ σ−
( ) = ( ( 1), ( 2), , ( )),ej j j jD t f D t D t D t h− − −…
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the expected demand as well as on the desired inventories (Ndj ) and
the actual stock of inventories (Nj): 
(3)
with .
Finally, in both scenarios, the output of consumption-good
firms is constrained by their capital stock (Kj). If the desired capital
stock (Kdj )—computed as a function of the desired level of produc-
tion—is higher than the current capital stock, firms invest (EIdj ) in
order to expand their production capacity10: 
(4)
Consumption-good firms have a capital stock composed of
heterogenous machines having different productivity levels. Firms
decide whether to scrap their machines following a payback period
rule, that is they assess whether the substitution cost of any current
machine, i.e. the price of a new one, can be recovered in a given
number of years through the savings obtained in production costs
(new machines have lower unit production cost than incumbent
ones). In this way, technical change and capital-good prices affect
the replacement decisions of consumption-good firms.11 The latter
choose their capital-good supplier comparing the price and
productivity of those machine tools which they know via the
brochures they received. Machine production is a time-consuming
process: consumption-good firms receive the ordered machines at
the end of the period.12 Gross investment of each firm is the sum
of expansion and replacement investment. Aggregate investment
is just the sum of the investments of all consumption good firms.
Given their current stock of machines, consumption-good firms
compute their average productivity and unit costs of production.
Firms fix prices applying a variable mark-up (μj) over the latter.
More precisely, we set an initial value for the mark-up , which
10. We assume that in any give period firm capital growth rates cannot exceed a fixed
maximum threshold consistent with the maximum capital growth rates found in the empirical
literature on firm investment patterns (Doms and Dunne, 1998).
11. This in line with a large body of empirical papers (Feldstein and Foot, 1971; Eisner, 1972;
Goolsbee, 1998) showing that replacement investment is typically not proportional to the
capital stock.
12.  The presence of gestation-lag effects in firm investments expenditures is supported by a
large body of empirical literature (see Del Boca et al., 2008).
( ) = ( ) ( ) ( 1),d e dj j j jQ t D t N t N t+ − −
 ( ) = ( ), [0,1]d ej jN t D tι ι∈
( ) = ( ) ( ).d dj j jEI t K t K t−
(0)μ
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is equal across firms. The variation of mark-ups over time are regu-
lated by the evolution of firms’ market shares (fj): firms raise (cut)
mark-up whenever the growth rate of their market shares is posi-
tive (negative): 
(5)
with . This process in turn implies that the average mark-
up rate  (as well as firms’ ones) fluctuate around a sort of peg
represented by the initial mark-up rate . The level of real wages
(w/cpi) is determined by the average mark-up rate in the consump-
tion-good sector, it follows that by by tuning up and down the
level  one can vary the long-term income distribution between
wages and profits in the economy.
Prices are one the key determinants of firms’ competitiveness.
The other ones are the levels of unfilled demand. If firms cannot
fully satisfy their customers, their competitiveness is accordingly
reduced.
Market shares evolve according to a replicator-type dynamics
operating under conditions of imperfect information,13 so that
even if the product is homogeneous, firms may charge different
prices. In such dynamics, firms with above-average competiti-
veness expand their market shares, while those below shrink (or
even die).
1.4. The labor market
We do not impose any assumption of labor-market clearing: as a
consequence involuntary unemployment as well as labor rationing
are the rule rather than the exception. The aggregate labor demand
is computed summing up the labor demand of capital—and
consumption—good firms. The aggregate supply of labor is exoge-
nous and inelastic. Aggregate employment is then the minimum
between labor demand and supply. The wage is set according to: 
(6)
13. See Rotemberg (2008) for a survey of the empirical literature on consumers’ imperfect price
knowledge.
( 1) ( 2)
( ) = ( 1) 1 ,
( 2)
j j
j j
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where  is the average labor productivity, cpi(t) is the
consumer price index, and U(t) is the unemployment rate. The
wage rate is determined by institutional and market factors, with
both indexation mechanisms upon consumption prices and
average productivity, on the one hand, and, adjustments to unem-
ployment rates, on the others. Notice that, by varying the
magnitude of the parameters ψ1,ψ2 and ψ3 in Equation (6), and the
initial mark-up rate  we are able to tune the distribution of
productivity gains between workers and firms as well as the sensiti-
vity of wages no unemployment variations (see Section 2 fore
more discussion). In this way, and inn line with works in the
“Régulation” literature, we capture different institutional regimes
governing labor market dynamics and demand formation (see
Boyer, 1988, for a taxonomy of those regimes). More precisely, in
Section 2.1 we begin our analysis of the role of wages and income
distribution in determining aggregate dynamics by restricting
ourselves to a regime wherein wage just grows with average
productivity, i.e. where ψ2 = ψ3 and = 0 and ψ1 > 0. In Section 2.2,
we remove this hypothesis and we perform experiments where
nominal wages are also a function of variations in
unemployment.14
1.5. Consumption, taxes, and public expenditures
As in Dosi et al. (2010) and Dosi et al. (2012) the model has a
public sector that levies taxes on firm profits and worker wages (or
on profits only) and pays to unemployed workers a subsidy, that is
a fraction of the current market wage. In those models, redistribu-
tive fiscal policies significantly affect the aggregate dynamics both
in the short- and in the long-run. Therefore, in what follows we set
both the tax and unemployment subsidy rate to zero. This allows
us to better analyze the role of income distribution and wage
formation on aggregate dynamics, and the one of nominal wage
flexibility on unemployment in particular.
All wages are consumed in the model. The aggregate consump-
tion (C) is the sum of income of both employed and unemployed
14.  In the experiments we present below average inflation is always very close to zero (see
Tables 2 and 3). However, we also experimented with regimes wherein wage move also as a
function of inflation rates (i.e. where ψ2 > 0). All the properties discussed below robustly hold.
 ( )AB t
(0)μ
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workers, as the model satisfies the standard national account iden-
tities: the sum of value added of capital—and consumption-goods
firms (Y) equals their aggregate production since in our simplified
economy there are no intermediate goods, and that in turn coin-
cides with the sum of aggregate consumption, investment and
change in inventories (ΔN): 
(7)
The micro decisions of a multiplicity of heterogenous, adaptive
agents and their interaction mechanisms is the explicit microfoun-
dation of the dynamics for all aggregate variables of interest (e.g.
output, investment, employment, etc.). 
2. Simulation results
In line with Dosi et al. (2010) and Dosi et al. (2012), we investi-
gated the micro and macro properties of the model through
extensive Monte-Carlo simulations.15 We perform our simulation
analysis in two complementary steps (see also the paper by Fagiolo
and Roventini in this issue for a discussion of this methodology).
First, we identify a “benchmark” setup for which the model is
empirically validated (see Table 1), i.e. it is able to replicate a wide
spectrum of microeconomic and macroeconomic stylized facts.
Next, we turn to a battery of “experiments”, by identifying sets of
parameters (e.g. the level of the initial mark-up rate, the degree of
wage-indexation to unemployment) whose values capture diffe-
rent structural conditions and/or policies.  
The macro and micro stylized facts robustly replicated by the
model are the same statistical regularities produced by and
discussed at much greater length in Dosi et al. (2010) and Dosi et
al. (2012). There we show that the model is able to generate
macroeconomic time-series of output, consumption and aggregate
investment characterized by self-sustained growth patterns and by
persistent fluctuations. Moreover, aggregate investment is more
volatile than GDP whereas consumption is less volatile.
15. All results discussed below refer to averages over MC = 50 Monte-Carlo iterations. Each
iteration has T = 600 time-steps.
 1 2
=1 =1
( ) ( ) = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
F F
i j
i j
Q t Q t Y t C t I t N tΔ+ ≡ + +∑ ∑
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In addition, the model replicates the empirically observable co-
movements between a large set of macro time series and GDP (net
investment and consumption pro-cyclical coincident, inflation
pro-cyclical and lagging, counter-cyclical mark-up rates, etc.). In
particular, the K+S model is also able to replicate two among the
most relevant statistical properties characterizing labor markets,
namely the fact that unemployment is strongly counter-cyclical
whereas real wages display little variation at business cycles
frequencies. At the same time, at the microeconomic level, the
Table 1. Benchmark Parameters
Description  Symbol  Value 
Number of firms in capital-good industry  F1 50 
Number of firms in consumption-good industry   F2 200 
R&D investment propensity 
 υ 0.04 
R&D allocation to innovative search   ξ 0.50 
Firm search capabilities parameters   ζ1,2 0.30
Beta distribution parameters (innovation process)   (α1, β1) (3,3)
Beta distribution support (innovation process)   [x1, x1] [–0.15,0.15]
New-customer sample parameter   γ 0.50
Desired inventories  ι 0.10
Payback period   b 3 
“Physical” scrapping age   η 20 
Capital-good firm mark-up rate   μ1 0.04 
Consumption-good firm initial mark-up  μ(0) 0.10 
Coefficient in the consumption-good desired 
production rule (profit-led scenario)  σ 2 
Coefficient in the consumption-good firm mark-up rule   υ 0.10 
Competitiveness weights   ω1,2 1 
Replicator dynamics coefficient   χ 1 
Wage setting  weight   ψ1 1 
Wage setting Δcpi weight   ψ2 0 
Wage setting ΔU weight   ψ3 0 
Tax rate   tr 0 
Unemployment subsidy rate   ϕ 0
Loan-to-value ratio  λ 2 
Baseline Interest Rate   r 0.025 
 ABΔ Δ
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model matches a wide set of stylized facts concerning firm dyna-
mics (including right-skewed distribution of firm sizes, fat-tailed
distributions of firm growth rates, wide and persistent producti-
vity differences across firms, lumpy investment dynamics).   
Figure 1. Profit-led investment scenario. Average GDP growth rate as a function 
of the mark-up rate (confidence bands in gray)
Figure 2. Profit-led investment scenario. Average unemployment rate as a function 
of the mark-up rate (confidence bands in gray)
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Encouraged by the empirical performance of the model, in the
next sections we turn to explore the behavior of the economy
under different income distribution hypotheses, and under diffe-
rent regimes of adjustment of nominal wages to variations in
unemployment.
Figure 3. Profit-led investment scenario. Standard deviation of GDP growth rate 
as a function of the mark-up rate (confidence bands in gray)
Figure 4. Profit-led investment scenario. Likelihood of crises in GDP as a function 
of the mark-up rate (95% confidence bands in gray) 
Note: Crises are defined as time periods with growth rates lower than –3%.
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2.1. Income distribution and growth regimes
Real wages in the model have a dual role. On the one hand, they
affect the level of firms’ costs and therefore profits, thus determi-
ning the ability of firms to survive and to finance production and
investment expenditures. On the other hand, real wages determine
aggregate consumption and via the latter they impact on firms’
investment decisions. The first effect is the one already emphasized
by Neo-Classical economists as well as by the works in the New
Keynesian literature with financial market imperfections (see
Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993), and it should have a detrimental
effect on growth and employment. In contrast, the second effect,
as emphasized by Keynes in his General Theory (see e.g. also
Howitt, 1986, for a discussion), should affect aggregate demand
and thus output and unemployment. In what follows, we study
the behavior of macro-variables in the model under different levels
of the wage-share in the economy. We change the dynamics of real
wages (and of profits) by tuning up and down the level of the
initial mark-up rate of consumption good firms. The latter indeed
determines consumption-good prices in the model, and therefore
it determines how real income is divided between profits and
wages (see also Section 1.3). Moreover, we perform the aforemen-
tioned experiment on income distributions under different
regimes of firms’ investment behavior. In the first scenario, desired
investment is “profit-led”. More precisely, desired investment in
new productive capacity is determined only by the degree of finan-
cial robustness of the firm, proxied by its stock of net liquid assets.
In the second scenario, instead, desired expansionary investment
is “demand-led”, i.e. driven by expectations about future consump-
tion demand (see also Section 1.3). Finally, notice that in both
scenarios desired investment plans can be constrained by the avai-
lability of internal and external finance, respectively determined
by the level of past profits, and by the external credit ceilings.
Let us start by discussing the result of the experiment under the
“profit-led” investment scenario. Figures 1 and 2, show average
growth and unemployment in relation to the (initial) mark-up
rate. Both figures indicate that very low levels of the mark-up rate
(and, thus, very high levels of real wages) have a detrimental effect
on average growth and average unemployment. These outcomes
correspond to the “Neo-Classical” result, according to which high
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real wages have a negative effect on long-run growth and employ-
ment. More specifically, a high level of real wages implies lower
firms’ profits, and therefore a lower incentive of firms to invest in
new productive capacities, and thus to absorb the existing labor
supply. In addition, also productivity growth is lower, as the intro-
duction of more productive machines is limited to the substitution
of the existing capital stock.
Furthermore, Figures 3 and 4 show that volatility and (even
more so) the likelihood of crises are high when the mark-up rate is
very low. In this profit-led investment scenario, short-run business
fluctuations are generated by a Goodwin-type dynamics
(Goodwin, 1967). An increase in profits promotes via investment
an increase in both production and productivity (due to introduc-
tion of new and more productive machines). Productivity gains
however imply also an increase in real wages and a reduction in
the profit rate thereby creating the conditions for a fall in
economic activity. The lower is the mark-up rate the stronger is the
above described predator-prey dynamics. Accordingly, both GDP
volatility and the likelihood of crises turns out to be high at low
levels of the mark-up rate.
What happens if one increases the mark-up and therefore
decreases the level of real wages in this scenario? As Figures 1-4
show quite starkly, increasing the mark-up has the effect of
increasing growth and reducing unemployment. The economy
enters into a “Classical Growth Regime” (see Boyer, 1988) where
productivity increases are able to promote profits, hence invest-
ment and effective demand, which enhance employment. In
addition, in this growth scenario, the above-described dynamics
between profits and wages is dampened by a lower mark-up rate
because the process of workers’ appropriation of productivity gains
through real wages is weakened. As a result, both GDP volatility
and the likelihood of crises are lowered. In particular, notice that
the economy is characterized by a wide region of high and stable
growth (corresponding to levels of mark-up between 0.075 and
0.15) wherein, on one side, average growth is maximized and, on
the other side, unemployment, volatility and the probability of
crises are zero.
As real wages are reduced further (μ(0) > 0.15), however, the
economy enters a region where high growth are associated to wild
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fluctuations, higher incidence of crises and positive unemploy-
ment. This occurs because the aforementioned “Classical” engine
of growth is hampered by the credit constraints imposed on firms
investment. More precisely, in this region the strong incentives of
firms to invest in large productive capacities imply also high debt
accumulation by firms. As time goes by, increasingly high debt
burdens erode profits, thereby creating the conditions for the inco-
ming recession. Accordingly, both volatility and the incidence of
crises become higher.
How do the above results change when firm investment is
“demand-led”? Figures 5, 6 and 7 compare the dynamics of macro-
variables in the profit-led vs. the demand-led scenarios, always as a
function of the mark-up rate. As in the profit-led scenario, low
levels of the mark-up rate are associated with low growth and high
unemployment and crisis incidence also in the demand-led
regime. The mechanisms generating this result are however
completely different between the two scenarios. In the profit-led
regime, low growth and high unemployment rates are determined
by the low incentive of firms to invest in new productive capaci-
ties. In contrast, in the demand-led scenario, the incentive to
invest is high when the mark-up rate is low, because wages and
thus expectations of consumption demand are very high.
However, firms desired investment plans are constrained by the
availability of internal and external financing, which are on
average lower in presence of a low profits. Moreover, a higher
incentive to invest induce a dynamics of debt accumulation
similar to the one analyzed in the case of the high-growth profit-
led regime, thereby causing higher volatility (not shown) and
crises incidence (cf. Figure 7). In light of the above, it comes as no
surprise that a small reduction in the (already high) level of real
wages is able to restore growth and reduce volatility and unem-
ployment (see Figure 5).
As the distribution of income between wages and profits gets
more balanced (0.05 ≤ μ(0) ≤ 0.15), the economy enters a regime
characterized high average growth rates and low unemployment
and volatility rates. Following the taxonomy suggested in Boyer
(1988), we shall label this a “Fordist Growth Regime”, roughly
matching the institutional conditions characterizing advanced
economies in the post-WWII period. Such a regime associates
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investment led by demand expectations with a balanced sharing of
productivity gains between workers and firms. In that, improve-
ments in productivity lead to significant increases in wages, thereby
rising aggregate demand both via consumption and investment by
firms. Notice that this regime is characterized by significantly
higher average growth rates than the Classical one discussed before.
In turn, this occurs because high levels of consumption demand
now reinforce via expectations aggregate investment, rather than
crowding it out as in the Classical regime.
The high dependence of growth on expectations about
consumption demand also implies the emergence of a wide region
wherein real wages and unemployment are inversely (rather than
directly) related. More precisely, in the demand-led scenario,
further increasing the profits rate in the economy result into a
significant increase of unemployment and of the incidence of
crises (see Figures 6 and 7). Moreover, very high levels of the mark-
up rate (μ(0) > 0.20, cf. Figure 5) locks the economy into a low-
growth trajectory (similar to what very high real wages do). This is
explained by the fact (see also Dosi et al., 2012 for a more detailed
discussion) that in presence of very low levels of expected demand,
firms have low incentive to undertake investments into new and
productive machines. This hampers the growth of productivity
and therefore the long-term growth prospects of the economy.   
Figure 5. Average GDP growth rate as a function of the mark-up rate 
(confidence bands in gray)
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Let us now summarize the different results of the section as well
as provide some implications for theory. First, our results indicate
that the economy is not always characterized by an inverse rela-
tion between real wages and employment. The presence of such a
relation is indeed closely associated to a profit-led investment
behavior by firms. In contrast, under regimes where investment is
driven by firms expectations such a relation is non-linear.
Figure 6. Average unemployment rate as a function of the mark-up rate
 (confidence bands in gray)
Figure 7. Likelihood of crises in GDP as a function of the mark-up rate 
(95% confidence bands in gray)
Note: Crises are defined as time periods with growth rates lower than -3%.
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In particular, there exists a threshold (corresponding to a low
level of mark-ups) above which unemployment decreases (rather
than increasing) with the level of the real wage in the economy.
Second, in line with Boyer (1988) and Freeman and Perez (1988),
our experiments indicate that endogenous innovation is not able
by itself to guarantee high and stable growth without the presence
of specific institutional conditions determining investment beha-
vior and the distribution of income between wages and profits.
However, differently from that literature our analysis shows that
independently from firm investment behavior the presence of
high growth together with low levels of volatility and unemploy-
ment, always requires a balance in the distribution of income
between profits and wages. When such a condition is not fulfilled
the economy gets either into a low and highly volatile growth trap
(low mark-up rate in either investment scenario, high mark-up rate
in the demand-led scenario), or into a situation where high growth
rates are associated with significant volatility and high unemploy-
ment rates (high mark-up rate in the profit-led scenario). In the
next section we investigate the robustness of the above results in
presence of wage flexibility to unemployment variations.
2.2. Nominal wages flexibility, growth and unemployment
In the previous section we have shown that the distribution of
income between profits and wages crucially affects the properties
of the macroeconomic dynamics and the rate of unemployment in
the economy. However, these results were obtained assuming that
in the labor market wages were only a function of labor producti-
vity. In this section, we remove this hypothesis, and we allow for
nominal wages that depend also on changes of the unemployment
rate. More precisely, we select different levels of the mark-up rate
and we run different Montecarlo experiments by varying the level
of the parameter ψ3 in Equation (6), i.e. the parameter tuning the
response of nominal wages to relative changes in the unemploy-
ment rate U. We perform the experiment for the scenario wherein
investment is profit-led and for the one in which investment is
demand-led. In this way, we study how all the results discussed in
the previous section change under higher levels of nominal wages
flexibility to unemployment variations.
Table 2 and 3 present the results of the above described experi-
ments. Notice that the levels of mark-ups presented in the tables
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correspond to different growth regimes (see previous section) . Let
us start by discussing the results for the scenario with profit-led
investment and low mark-up rate (μ(0) = 0.01). In this region of
the parameters’ space, the high-level of real wages depresses profits
and therefore the incentive to invest. One could therefore expect a
positive effect of downward wage flexibility on the economy. This
is not the case, however. Introducing wage flexibility does not
affect growth and it does not reduce unemployment (see Table 2,
first and second column). Furthermore, increasing nominal wage-
flexibility exacerbates the volatility of the economy. More preci-
sely, increasing the sensitivity of wages to unemployment implies
a significant increase both in the standard deviation of GDP
growth and in the likelihood of crises (Table 2, columns 3 and 4).
The same occurs for the standard deviation of the inflation rate
(column 6). The significant increase in volatility is explained by
the fact that wage flexibility strengthen the competition between
profits and wages, which is one of the main mechanisms genera-
ting fluctuations in the profit-led investment scenario.
The situation dramatically changes when we consider higher
levels of the mark-up rate. Take for instance the scenario with
mark-up rate μ(0) = 0.05. There, the distribution of income
between profits and wages ensures that firms have enough incen-
tive to invest and therefore growth unfolds according to the
“Classical” mechanisms described in the previous section. In that
growth regime, wage-flexibility is able to significantly reduce
unemployment. In addition, the increases in growth and inflation
volatility are small and in most cases not significant. Notice,
however, that wage flexibility also induces a small reduction in the
average growth rate of the economy. In turn, this outcome is
explained by the fact that wage flexibility reduce firm incentives to
replace their machines, thus curbing productivity growth.
All the patterns described above emerge even more starkly in
the high mark-up scenario (μ(0) = 0.03 see Table 2). More precisely,
wage-flexibility significantly reduces unemployment and brings a
small reduction in average growth. However, and differently from
the case with μ(0) = 0.05 discussed before, now an increase in
wage-flexibility results in a reduction both of the standard devia-
tion of GDP growth and of the likelihood of crises.
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Table 2. Profit-led investment scenario. Experiments with different degrees 
of nominal wages flexibility to unemployment variations
(Monte-Carlo simulations standard errors in brackets)
  Avg.GDP Avg.unempl.  St.dev. GDP  Avg.likel.  Avg. infl.  St.dev. 
 growth rate  rate  growth rate  GDP crises  rate  infl. rate 
Mark-Up Rate 0.01
ψ3 = 0.0 0.0060 (0.0003) 0.7386(0.0108) 0.0746(0.0015) 0.1442(0.0042) 0.0001(0.0000) 0.0591(0.0017) 
ψ3 = 0.2 0.0068(0.0003) 0.7113(0.0110) 0.0746(0.0014) 0.1963(0.0057) 0.0005(0.0000) 0.0673(0.0019)  
ψ3 = 0.4 0.0086(0.0004) 0.6300(0.0206) 0.0819(0.0043) 0.2023(0.0055) 0.0010(0.0001) 0.0732(0.0016) 
ψ3 = 0.6 0.0074(0.0004) 0.6703(0.0193) 0.1294(0.0350) 0.1816(0.0089) 0.0009(0.0002) 0.0723(0.0022) 
ψ3 = 0.8 0.0040(0.0010) 0.7124(0.0174) 0.4883(0.1149) 0.2106(0.0134) 0.0006(0.0002)  0.0708(0.0022) 
Mark-Up Rate 0.05
 ψ3 = 0.0 0.0270(0.0005) 0.1463(0.0287) 0.0456 (0.0014) 0.0582(0.0066) 0.0001(0.0000) 0.0353(0.0018) 
ψ3 = 0.2 0.0266(0.0005) 0.1098(0.0248) 0.0491(0.0014) 0.0733(0.0067) 0.0019 (0.0001) 0.0413(0.0017) 
ψ3 = 0.4 0.0247(0.0007) 0.0694(0.0187) 0.0562(0.0021) 0.0770(0.0054) 0.0035(0.0002) 0.0534(0.0028) 
ψ3 = 0.6 0.0198(0.0011) 0.0576 (0.0188) 0.0600 (0.0059) 0.0752 (0.0067) 0.0053 (0.0004) 0.0531(0.0032) 
ψ3 = 0.8 0.0177(0.0013) 0.0391 (0.0134) 0.0548 (0.0023) 0.0714 (0.0048) 0.0069 (0.0005) 0.0565(0.0040)  
Mark-Up Rate 0.20
ψ3 = 0.0 0.0309(0.0001) 0.0032(0.0010) 0.0332(0.0015) 0.0118(0.0014) 0.0000(0.0000) 0.0147(0.0007) 
ψ3 = 0.2  0.0311(0.0001)  0.0019(0.0003)  0.0470(0.0035)  0.0261(0.0024)  0.0017(0.0002)  0.0288(0.0019) 
ψ3 = 0.4 0.0278(0.0007) 0.0028(0.0006) 0.0574(0.0047) 0.0414(0.0050) 0.0027(0.0003) 0.0389(0.0035) 
ψ3 = 0.6  0.0250(0.0012)  0.0024(0.0003)  0.0526(0.0041)  0.0362(0.0046)  0.0033(0.0004)  0.0347 (0.0028) 
ψ3 = 0.8 0.0207(0.0015) 0.0030(0.0008) 0.0476(0.0035) 0.0334(0.0041) 0.0054(0.0007) 0.0373(0.0031) 
Mark-Up Rate 0.30
ψ3 = 0.0 0.0295(0.0002) 0.1318(0.0097) 0.2360(0.0091) 0.1596(0.0089) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0243(0.0008) 
ψ3 = 0.2 0.0307(0.0002) 0.0712(0.0113) 0.1849(0.0108) 0.1311(0.0080) 0.0014(0.0002) 0.0398(0.0025) 
ψ3 = 0.4 0.0263(0.0008) 0.0532(0.0111) 0.1707(0.0100) 0.1431(0.0072) 0.0033(0.0004) 0.0593(0.0042) 
ψ3 = 0.6 0.0222(0.0012) 0.0521(0.0112) 0.1605(0.0111) 0.1352(0.0076) 0.0049(0.0005) 0.0627(0.0047) 
ψ3 = 0.8 0.0173(0.0014) 0.0519(0.0112) 0.1435(0.0124) 0.1168(0.0088) 0.0061(0.0007) 0.0572(0.0043) 
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Table 3. Demand-led investment scenario. Experiments with different degrees 
of nominal wages flexibility to unemployment variations
(Monte-Carlo simulations standard errors in brackets)
  Avg.GDP Avg.unempl.  St.dev. GDP  Avg.likel.  Avg. infl.  St.dev. 
 growth rate  rate  growth rate  GDP crises  rate  infl. rate 
Mark-Up Rate 0.01
ψ3 = 0.0 0.0042 0.7447 0.1952 0.1121 0.0001 0.0687 (0.0003) (0.0092) (0.0237) (0.0045) (0.0000) (0.0026) 
ψ3 = 0.2 0.0042 0.7356 0.2080 0.1206 0.0005 0.0767 (0.0006) (0.0135) (0.0193) (0.0048) (0.0001) (0.0034) 
ψ3 = 0.4 0.0045 0.7364 0.1881 0.1222 0.0007 0.0772 (0.0004) (0.0115) (0.0226) (0.0050) (0.0001) (0.0037) 
ψ3 = 0.6 0.0040 0.7432 0.1997 0.1336 0.0011 0.0766 (0.0006) (0.0130) (0.0208) (0.0051) (0.0001) (0.0022) 
ψ3 = 0.8 0.0038 0.7629 0.2884 0.1465 0.0012 0.0824 (0.0007) (0.0136) (0.0697) (0.0059) (0.0002) (0.0034) 
Mark-Up Rate 0.05
ψ3 = 0.0 0.0334 0.0307 0.0293 0.0080 0.0002 0.0137 (0.0003) (0.0119) (0.0008) (0.0043) (0.0000) (0.0010) 
ψ3 = 0.2 0.0333 0.0318 0.0291 0.0092 0.0025 0.0133 (0.0002) (0.0080) (0.0008) (0.0033) (0.0001) (0.0007) 
ψ3 = 0.4 0.0330 0.0509 0.0304 0.0169 0.0048 0.0170 (0.0003) (0.0150) (0.0012) (0.0058) (0.0001) (0.0013) 
ψ3 = 0.6 0.0335 0.0285 0.0285 0.0080 0.0074 0.0175 (0.0002) (0.0086) (0.0008) (0.0028) (0.0001) (0.0009) 
ψ3 = 0.8 0.0331 0.0540 0.0301 0.0151 0.0093 0.0218 (0.0003) (0.0178) (0.0012) (0.0053) (0.0003) (0.0014) 
Mark-Up Rate 0.20
ψ3 = 0.0 0.0314 0.2307 0.7430 0.1660 0.0000 0.0858 (0.0006) (0.0132) (0.0680) (0.0043) (0.0001) (0.0033) 
ψ3 = 0.2 0.0308 0.2356 0.7018 0.1683 0.0016 0.0826 (0.0006) (0.0124) (0.0751) (0.0038) (0.0001) (0.0031) 
ψ3 = 0.4 0.0296 0.2289 0.8236 0.1586 0.0026 0.1004 (0.0012) (0.0123) (0.0914) (0.0042) (0.0001) (0.0047) 
ψ3 = 0.6 0.0280 0.2374 0.8185 0.1612 0.0037 0.1007 (0.0015) (0.0173) (0.1028) (0.0055) (0.0002) (0.0036) 
ψ3 = 0.8 0.0289  0.2356 0.6773 0.1624 0.0046 0.1132 (0.0015) (0.0105) (0.0632) (0.0037) (0.0003) (0.0046) 
Mark-Up Rate 0.30
ψ3 = 0.0  0.0128  0.7733  1.7748  0.3388  -0.0003  0.1810  (0.0021)  (0.0216)  (0.0998)  (0.0042)  (0.0001)  (0.0088) 
ψ3 = 0.2  0.0128  0.8144  1.8682  0.3416  -0.0003  0.1835  (0.0020)  (0.0226)  (0.0831)  (0.0042)  (0.0001)  (0.0091) 
ψ3 = 0.4  0.0128  0.7836  2.0117  0.3390  -0.0006  0.1884  (0.0017)  (0.0215)  (0.0765)  (0.0037)  (0.0002)  (0.0102) 
ψ3 = 0.6  0.0125  0.8259  1.9303  0.3401  -0.0004  0.1705  (0.0019)  (0.0237)  (0.0869)  (0.0044)  (0.0001)  (0.0100) 
ψ3 = 0.8  0.0136  0.8018  1.8278  0.3384  -0.0004  0.1816  (0.0020)  (0.0249)  (0.0794)  (0.0045)  (0.0001)  (0.0103) 
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Overall, the results of the above experiments indicate that the
flexibility of nominal wages to unemployment variations can
stabilize the economy and reduce unemployment, when growth is
driven by a Classical mechanism, linking productivity growth to
investment determined by firms’ profits. Moreover, the role of
wage-flexibility as a stabilizing device is stronger the more the
distribution of income is biased towards profits.
How does the above picture change when we turn to the
demand-led scenario? Notice that in that scenario, investment is
tied to the level of real wages via expectations of consumption
demand. In turn, such a Keynesian expectation effect can be
stronger than the cost-saving effect when wages are reduced
following an increase in unemployment. Accordingly, higher
wage-flexibility to unemployment can de-stabilize (rather than
stabilize) investment and aggregate demand (see Keynes, 1936;
Howitt, 1986; Amendola et al., 2004). A rise in the degree of wage-
flexibility does not provoke a reduction in average unemployment
in any of the scenarios considered in the table. Consider for
instance the experiments with high mark-up rates (respectively
μ(0) = 0.20 and μ(0) = 0.30). Except for inflation volatility, none of
the macroeconomic statistics reported in Table 3 display a statisti-
cally significant variation when we increase the degree of wage-
flexibility.
One could expect the above results to be different in the scena-
rios with low mark-up rates (μ(0) = 0.05 and μ(0) = 0.01). There,
real wages and the level of consumption demand are expected to
be high, and therefore the cost-saving effect associated with wage
reductions in presence of unemployment could dominate the
Keynes’ expectation effect. Once again, the results in Table 3 show
that this does not happen. Higher degrees of wage-flexibility do
not lead to unemployment reductions. On the contrary, unem-
ployment increases (even though the variation is not statistically
significant). In addition, high levels of wage-flexibility lead to an
increase in the likelihood of crises when the level of the mark-up is
very low (μ(0) = 0.01).
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3. Concluding remarks
Using the Keynes+Schumpeter (K+S) agent-based model deve-
loped in Dosi et al. (2010, 2012) we investigated the characteristics
of growth regimes emerging different rules for firms’ investment
decisions and different distributions of income between profits and
wages. We studied the aggregate dynamics when investment is
determined by the stock of liquid assets of the firm (“profit-led
investment scenario”) and when it is determined according to
expected demand (“demand-led investment scenario”). We
showed that, independently from the investment scenario, the
occurrence of stable growth associated with low unemployment
requires a balanced distribution of income between profits and
wages. Moreover, we showed that in the demand-led scenario the
economy is characterized by a non-linear relation between the
level of real wages and the unemployment rate. In particular, we
find a threshold below which further reductions in the average real
wage are associated with an increase (rather than an decrease) in
unemployment. Finally, we investigated whether the introduction
of increasing degrees of nominal wage-flexibility to unemployment
variations are able to restore growth and curb unemployment. We
showed that this is indeed the case when investment is profit-led
and the mark-up rate in the economy is able to ensure positive
growth. In contrast, in the demand-led scenario wage-flexibility
never brings reductions in unemployment and in some cases can
also result into a higher incidence of crises in the economy. Accor-
dingly, our results cast doubts on the effectiveness of policies
promoting wage-flexibility when investment is related to expecta-
tions about future consumption demand.
The present work could be extended in at least two directions.
First, one could extend the above analysis by considering several
open economies, whose ability to export may depend on the level
of wages, and there study how the results of this work may change
in that context. Second, we considered only a very stylized repre-
sentation of labor market interactions. However, one could easily
extend the above framework to introduce a full-fledged analysis of
the labor market, e.g. like in Fagiolo et al. (2004); Dawid et al.
(2011) and study the inter-play between this market and the
processes of technical change and of the determination of income-
distribution in the economy.
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